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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
CaseNo.960656-CA

v.

PAUL BURNINGHAM,
Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
In response to the State's appeal, the defendant raises the issue of whether a trial court may
grant the remedy of dismissal-with-prejudice for a discovery violation pursuant to Rule 16(g) of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure irrespective of the provisions of Rule 25 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which governs the dismissal of criminal cases without trial. In his cross-appeal, the
defendant raises the issue of whether Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, applied through Rule
81(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, mandates the awarding of attorney's fees for the refiling of
criminal charges that were previously voluntarily dismissed by the State. These issues principally
concern questions of law which are reviewed for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah
1991). The cross-appeal also necessarily raises the claim that Judge Dever abused his discretion in
refusing to award attorney' s fees. Claims of abuse of discretion are reviewed with deference to the
trial court. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,988 (Utah 1988).
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RULES OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The State's appeal does not directly implicate any specific statutory or constitutional
construction, but rather it regards the construction to be given to Rules 16 and 25 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter URCrP). URCrP 16 addresses discovery in criminal cases, and
URCrP 25 addresses the dismissal of criminal cases without trial. In relevant part, these rules
provide:
"If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention
of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule [pertaining to
discovery], the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection,
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed,
or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
URCrP 16(g) (emphasis added).
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance ofjustice, the court
may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, order an
information or indictment dismissed.
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when:
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing the defendant to
trial...
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and entered
into the minutes.
(d) If the dismissal is based upon grounds that there was unreasonable delay,...
further prosecution for the offense shall not be barred..
URCrP 25 (emphasis added).
Likewise, the defendant's cross-appeal does not directly implicate any statutory or
constitutional construction, but rather he calls upon the Court to construe Rules 41 and 81 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter URCP) in conjunction with URCrP 16(g). In relevant
part, these civil procedure rules provide:
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"Voluntary dismissal, effect thereof
(1) By plaintiff, by stipulation ... [A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff
without order of the court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, or
(ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the
action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the
dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an
adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in
any court in the United States or of any state an action based on or including the
same claim.
(2) By order of the court. Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance
save upon the order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court
deems proper. ... Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph is without prejudice.
URCP 41(a) (italics added).
"Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an
action in any court commences an action based upon or including the same claim
against the same defendant, the court may make such order for the payment of costs
for the action previously dismissed as it may deem proper and may stay the
proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied with the order.
URCP 41(d).
"Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall also
govern in an aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable
statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any statutory
or constitutional requirement.
URCP 81(e).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Supplementing its argument in its original brief, the State argues in response to the issues
raised by the defendant: (1) that he misconstrues the Rules of Criminal Procedure when he invites
the Court to construe URCrP 16(g) to liberally confer upon trial courts the power to dismiss
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criminal prosecutions with prejudice without first determining that no less harsh remedy may be
employed; (2) that he misconstrues URCP 81 (e) to mean that the rule governing the dismissal of
civil actions supersedes the rule governing the dismissal of criminal indictments and informations;
(3) that if URCP 41 does apply to the facts of this case, then the defendant must concede that the
trial courts each erred in purporting to dismiss this prosecution with prejudice; and (4) that if
URCP 41 does apply to the facts of this case, the defendant has failed to make any showing that the
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to award attorneys fees.

ARGUMENT
I. URCrP 16(g) may not be Construed in a Vacuum.
The defendant takes issue with the State for what the defendant characterizes as the State's
"...attempts to hide behind Rule 25 to justify its erroneous refiling of this action." Defendant's brief
at page 10. The defendant then goes on to argue that this case was not originally dismissed
pursuant to URCrP 25, but rather it was dismissed by Judge Palmer pursuant to URCrP 16(g) as the
remedy for a discovery violation. By his attempt to distance URCrP 25 from the resolution of this
case, the defendant ignores the plain reading of URCrP 25, which designates it as the only rule of
criminal procedure that governs the dismissal without trial of criminal indictments or informations.
Thus, although URCrP 16(g) undisputedly authorizes the trial court to fashion an appropriate
remedy any time a discovery violation occurs, when that remedy is to be a dismissal-withprejudice, such an order of dismissal can only properly be entered pursuant to URCrP 25. See Salt
Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh 912 P.2d 452,456 (Utah App. 1996) (stating plainly the proposition
that "A dismissal [of a criminal case] can only be entered pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of
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Criminal Procedure"). Accordingly, the defendant has failed to present any meaningful challenge
to the State's argument that as construed by this Court in Dorman-Ligh, URCrP 25 mandates that a
dismissal may only be construed as a dismissal-with-prejudice if it is accompanied by specific
findings justifying that extraordinary remedy by explaining why no lesser remedy would suffice.
II. The Rule Governing the Dismissal of Civil Actions does not Supersede
the Rule Governing the Dismissal of Informations and Indictments.
The defendant's attempt to distance URCrP 25fromthe resolution of this case is manifest
anew in his argument that this Court should view URCP 81(e) as a vehicle to apply URCP 41 as
governing Judge Palmer's original dismissal of this case. The defendant's argument that this Court
should view the rule governing the dismissal of civil actions as superseding the rule addressing the
dismissal of criminal indictments or informations defies logic. In response to this bold assertion,
which is forwarded by the defendant without any legal analysis, the State notes simply that by its
plain language, URCP 41 addresses the dismissal of an "action,"1 whereas the plain language of
URCrP 25 addresses the dismissal of an "indictment or information."2 Since this is undisputedly
an appeal of the dismissal of an information charging a public offense, URCrP 25 is the exclusive
rule that purports to govern this issue.
III. The Rules of Civil Procedure Disfavor Dismissals-With-Prejudice.
Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant is correct in asserting that URCrP 25 is
inapplicable to the resolution of this case, and that URCP 41 does govern, then the defendant is
hard-pressed to explain how Judge Dever could have properly construed Judge Palmer's order of

URCP 3 explains that a "action" is commenced by thefilingof a civil complaint.
URCrP 4 explains that the prosecution of a public offense is commenced by the filing of an indictment or
information.
5
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dismissal as "with prejudice" when it was issued pursuant to the State's motion to dismiss without
prejudice. This is so because URCP 41 provides, in relevant part: "Unless otherwise stated in the
notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is withoutprejudice...Unless otherwise specified in
the order [of dismissal], a dismissal under this paragraph is withoutprejudice." URCP
41 (a)(l)&(2) (emphasis added).3 Therefore, if URCP 41 does govern, then the rule plainly applies
to mean that Judge Palmer's order of dismissal—grantedupon the State's motion for dismissal
without prejudice—andnot specifying that it would be "with prejudice"—is without prejudice.

IV. The Award of Attorney's Fees upon the Recommencement
of an Action is Discretionary.
Again, assuming, arguendo, that URCP 41 does apply in this case, the defendant ignores in
his argument that the award of attorney's fees pursuant to URCP 41 (d) is discretionary, not
mandatory. Because the language of this rule provides that "...the court may make such order for
the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem proper..." it is the
defendant's burden to show that the trial court abused its discretion in not awarding fees. See Dixie
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,988 (Utah 1988). The defendant, who presented a novel
demand—the assessment of fees against a prosecutor—withoutshowing any precedent for such an
award, and without showing why such an award promotes the interest of insuring fundamentally
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Although URCP 41(a)(1) also states that a voluntary dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits if the
same claim had been previously dismissed, this portion of the rule is inapplicable to the facts of this case.
Also, although URCP 41(b) would provide that an involuntary dismissal, issued upon the defendant's motion for
failure to prosecute or failure to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure or an order of the court, would likewise
operate as an adjudication upon the merits, the dismissal by Judge Palmer was not issued pursuant to the defendant's
motion, but rather it was issued pursuant to the State's motion to dismiss without prejudice. Thus, although the
defendant accuses the State of cleverly skirting the imposition of an involuntary dismissal by making a preemptive
motion to voluntarily dismiss, his opportunity to clarify that Judge Palmer's dismissal should have been with
prejudice passed when he failed to moved Judge Palmer to amend his order to show "with prejudice."
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fair trials of public offenses, has not met this burden. Because the defendant has not met his burden
to show why attorney's fees should have been awarded, his claim for attorney's fees must fail.

CONCLUSION
The defendant's brief fails to present any cogent response to the State's argument that Judge
Palmer's order of dismissal—issued in response to the State's motion to dismiss-without-prejudice—
must be construed as without prejudice, or to the State's argument that the defendant was never
entitled to the remedy of dismissal-with-prejudice. Rather, the defendant argues that the rule
governing the dismissal of criminal informations does not apply in this appeal of the dismissal of a
criminal information, and he argues that this Court should look instead to the Rules of Civil
Procedure, because in the Rules of Civil Procedure lies an argument for the award of attorney's
fees. In his zeal to present his attorney's-fees argument, however, he ignores that pursuant to the
application of those rules, the dismissal in this case was not with-prejudice,and the award of
attorney's fees was not mandatory. Because the defendant has failed to show an abuse of discretion
by the denial of fees, his cross-appeal must fail, and because no explanation supports construing the
order as a dismissal-with-prejudice,the State's appeal should succeed.
Respectfully submitted this

of May, 1997.

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
Salt Lake District Attorney, by

STEPHEN MERCER,
Deputy District Attorney
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